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Abstract
The accumulated knowledge and the prospects for commercial energy production from
fission breeder and fusion reactors are analyzed in this report.
The publicly available data from past experimental breeder reactors indicate that a large
number of unsolved technological problems exist and that the amount of “created” fissile
material, either from the U238 → Pu239 or from the Th232 → U233 cycle, is still far below
the breeder requirements and optimistic theoretical expectations. Thus huge efforts, includ-
ing many basic research questions with an uncertain outcome, are needed before a large
commercial breeder prototype can be designed. Even if such efforts are undertaken by the
technologically most advanced countries, it will take several decades before such a prototype
can be constructed. We conclude therefore, that ideas about near-future commercial fission
breeder reactors are nothing but wishful thinking.
We further conclude that, no matter how far into the future we may look, nuclear fusion as
an energy source is even less probable than large-scale breeder reactors, for the accumulated
knowledge on this subject is already sufficient to say that commercial fusion power will never
become a reality.
∗e-mail:Michael.Dittmar@cern.ch
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1 Introduction
Over one hundred years ago, physicists began to understand that a huge amount of energy could
be obtained from mastering nuclear fusion and fission energy. For example, the production of only
1 kg of helium from hydrogen “liberates” a thermal energy of about 200 million kWh. In the sun,
this fusion reaction transforms about 600 million tons of hydrogen into helium every second, thus
liberating 4× 1026 Joules per second.
The understanding of nuclear physics and its technological applications proceeded with a
breathtaking speed. It took only seven years from the discovery of the neutron in 1931 to the
observation of the neutron induced fission of uranium at the end of 1938. This was followed, on
the 2nd of December 1942, by a sustained nuclear chain reaction with a power of 0.5 Watt (and
up to 200 Watt at a later time) by E. Fermi and his team below the Chicago University football
stadium [1]. The next steps in using nuclear energy were the explosions of the Hiroshima and
Nagasaki fission bombs, on the 6th and 9th of August 1945, resulting in more than 100,000 deaths
and the beginning of the nuclear arms race. Only a few years after the first fission bombs exploded,
the USA and the Soviet Union had constructed hydrogen fusion bombs. These bombs were up to
1000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima fission bomb.
Also the peaceful application of nuclear fission energy happened very quickly: by 1954 the
thermal energy from a controlled fission chain reaction could be used to produce commercial
electric energy [2]. During the next 30-40 years a large number of commercial nuclear power plants
were constructed in most industrialized countries.
The quick scientific and technical success in bringing this form of power into the production of
commercial energy was impressive. Many nuclear pioneers expected that nuclear fission and fusion
would provide their grandchildren with cheap, clean and essentially unlimited energy. In fact, these
successes led most of us to a euphoric and blind belief in continuous scientific and technological
progress.
In contrast to such dreams, nuclear fission energy nowadays is not cheap and even the most
optimistic nuclear fusion believers do not expect the first commercial fusion reactor prototype until
after 2050. One observes further that nuclear fission energy has been stagnating for about ten years
and that its relative share in the worldwide electric energy production has decreased from about
18% during the nineties to only 13.8% [3].
Furthermore, the average age of the existing nuclear power plants, the limitations of primary
and secondary uranium resources as well as the problems related to nuclear proliferation and
nuclear waste all lead to doubts about the prospects of the standard water moderated nuclear
fission reactors. In fact it seems clear at this point that as fossil-fuel energy production declines,
sufficient energy to ensure the survival of our highly industrialized civilization can not come from
a rapid growth of nuclear fission energy of this sort.
The problem with the limited amount of uranium resources can theoretically be addressed with
the mastering of the technology of nuclear fission breeder reactors. It is claimed that this technology
could increase the amount of fissile material from uranium by a factor of 60-100 and much more if
the thorium breeder cycle can be realized [4]. It is believed that the breeder technology will enable
us to bridge the time gap before nuclear fusion energy, which would become the “final solution”
to all energy worries, can be mastered [5].
In this final chapter IV of “The Future of Nuclear Energy” report, we discuss the experience
with past and current breeder reactors in section 3. We analyze how the remaining problems will
be addressed with the worldwide Generation IV breeder reactor program and with thorium based
breeder reactors (section 4). The remaining obstacles towards a controlled and sustained nuclear
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fusion reaction chain are presented in section 5. In order to simplify the discussion, we start in
section 2 with some facts and basic physics principles of nuclear fission and fusion energy.
2 Energy from nuclear fission and fusion, some facts and
physics
As we have discussed in detail in chapters I-III of this report [6], the publicly available data on
the long term worldwide natural uranium supply are in conflict already with a moderate annual
1% growth rate for conventional water moderated reactors.
Consequently, believers in a bright future of nuclear energy should concentrate their efforts
either (1) on the realization of the nuclear fuel breeder technology based on the uranium cycle,
U238 to PU239, and the thorium cycle, TH232 to U233, or (2) on the mastering of the commercial
nuclear fusion reaction.
In this section an overview of the existing and planned nuclear reactor types and the experience
with fast breeder reactors (FBR) is given (2.1). This is followed by a basic summary of the most
important principles relevant for the use of nuclear fission and fusion energy (2.2 to 2.4).
2.1 Facts on the existing and planned nuclear reactor types
The worldwide nuclear fission reactors produced 2601 TWhe during the year 2008, or roughly 14%
of the world wide electric energy.
For the year 2009 one finds that the commercial nuclear energy production will come from 436
nuclear fission reactors with a combined nominal electric power of 370.260 GWe[7].
Reactor Type Terminated Operating under construction
(IAEA/PRIS) # Power[GWe] % # Power[GWe] % # Power[GWe] %
PWR 34 15.6 43 264 243 66 43 39.8 84
PHWR 5 0.3 0.8 44 22.4 6.1 4 1.3 2.8
BWR 23 6.67 18 92 83.6 23 3 3.9 8.3
other 54 12.7 35 34 20.3 5.5 1 0.92 2
FBR 6 1.5 4.3 2 0.69 0.2 2 1.2 2.6
total 122 36.7 100 436 370 100 53 47.2 100
Table 1: The evolution of different reactor types and their corresponding electric power rating from
the IAEA PRIS data base (October 2009) [7]. Another 5 reactors are listed in the “Long Term
Shutdown” category, four are PHWR’s and one of them is the 0.25 GWe Monju sodium cooled
FBR reactor in Japan.
The PRIS data base from the International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA) shows that the
dominant reactor type today and currently under construction are the water moderated fission reactors.
The abbreviations PWR (PHWR) stand for pressurized (heavy) water reactors and BWR for boiling
water reactors. As can be seen from Table 1, these reactors provide over 94% of the nuclear fission power
worldwide. The remaining 6% of the nuclear fission power comes from graphite moderated and water
or gas cooled older and smaller reactors. It seems that the PWR type has won the competition for the
existing reactors and for the next round by a large margin.
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One observes that only two FBR’s are declared operational and one is since 1995 in a “long term”
shutdown phase. These FBR’s contribute currently 0.2% of the world nuclear power. This tiny contribu-
tion from FBR’s today is even smaller than it used to be. In the list of 122 terminated reactors one finds
6 FBR’s with a combined power of 1.6 GWe, or 4.3%. In the list of 53 reactors (October 2009) currently
under construction, one finds only two relatively small FBR’s.
These numbers indicate not only that FBR’s have a negligible role today and during the next 10 years,
but also that their operation experience is far from being an economical and technological success story.
Some more details on the worldwide experience with various types of commercial FBR and ”thorium fuel
breeder” reactors and their operation are listed below:
• The best operation experience comes from the BN-600 FBR reactor with a rated power of 0.56
GWe in Russia. This reactor has been operated commercially for 28 years and is scheduled to
close in 2010 [8]. Its average energy availability is given as 73.79%. In a specialized document from
the IAEA fast reactor data base, [9], one finds that this reactor would be better called a “Fast
Reactor”, as it was designed to use more fuel than it could produce. A new BN-800 reactor with
0.8 GWe, is currently under construction in Russia and its scheduled start is now given as 2014. As
its smaller “brother”, it is designed to consume Pu239 rather than to produce more fissile material.
• The other “operating” FBR is the Phenix reactor in France. Phenix originally started operation
with a power of 0.233 GWe in 1974. Since 1997 it is rated with only 0.13 GWe and an energy
availability factor of 60.23% in 2008. According to the WNA (world nuclear association) data base
it ceased power production in March 2009 and will continue a research program till October 2009
[10]. The larger Super Phenix reactor, with a power rating of 1.2 GWe, achieved a maximal energy
availability of 32.6% only. This very low performance, in comparison to PWR’s, was achieved
during the last operational year (1996) and after a short lifetime of 10 years.
• The Monju reactor in Japan was closed after a serious sodium leak in 1995. Since many years the
reactor is scheduled to start the subsequent year. Perhaps this time it will really restart during the
first few months of 2010 [11].
• The next generation FBR reactor is currently under construction in India. According to the current
plans, it will start producing electric energy during the year 2011 [12].
• The KNK II reactor in Germany is listed in the IAEA data base, [9], with a tiny capacity of 0.017
GWe. During its operational lifetime, 1978 to 1991, it achieved an average energy availability factor
of 23.65%. A larger FBR, the SNR-300, with a rated power of 0.3 GWe was completed in 1985 but
for various reasons never started. A large 1.5 GWe FBR, the SNR-2, never terminated even the
design phase.
• A rather limited experience with a thorium admixture in the nuclear fuel in commercial prototype
reactors exists. A WNA document mentions two THTR (Thorium High Temperature Reactor)
[13]: One with 0.3 GWe in Germany, which operated commercially between 1986 and 1989; the
second was the Fort St Vrain reactor with a power rating of 0.33 GWe in the USA. It is listed
as the only commercial thorium-fuelled nuclear plant, following closely the german design. It was
operated between 1976-1989.
The WNA document mentions further that the experimental Shippingport reactor in the USA,
rated power of 0.060 GWe, has successfully demonstrated the concept of a Light Water Breeder
Reactor (LWBR) using thorium. The Shippingport reactor began commercial electricity produc-
tion in December 1957. In 1965 the Atomic Energy Commission started designing the uranium-
233/thorium core for the reactor. The reactor was operated as a LWBR between August 1977 and
October 1982.
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Several countries have so far managed to construct GWe water moderated slow neutron reactors,
mostly of the PWR type. These reactors were operated safely and efficiently for many years, using U235
fuel enriched to 3-4%.
In contrast, large breeder reactors, based on a large amount of initial fissile material and the trans-
formation of U238 and Th232 for making new reactor fuel, have so far not even passed successfully a
prototype phase.
2.2 Energy from nuclear fission and fusion, some basics
Atoms consist of a nucleus, made of protons and neutrons, and electrons. The size and the chemical
properties of atoms are defined by the number of electrons surrounding the nucleus. The combined mass
of the protons and neutrons, each 2000 times heavier than the electrons, defines roughly the mass of
the atoms. As the nucleus is 100000 times smaller than the atom it follows that its mass density is
huge in comparison with the atom. The same chemical characteristics can be expected for atoms with a
fixed number of protons and with different number of neutrons and the energy in chemical reactions is
of the order of 1 eV (1.6 × 10−19 Joule). As the nuclear properties of an atom depend on the number of
neutrons, the name isotope has been introduced to separate the chemically identical atoms according to
their number of neutrons.
Without going into details, it is known today that the energy source of the sun and other stars is
nuclear fusion. This fusion starts from the large number of hydrogen atoms present in the sun. The
fusion reaction in stars is possible because of the enormous gravitational pressure which overcomes the
electric repulsive force between positively charged protons. Fusion is the source of all heavier elements
which were formed in super-novae explosions of super large early stars and shortly after the big bang.
For our subsequent discussions on nuclear fusion it is important to note that a relatively low fusion power
density, about 0.3 Watt/m3, is found in the sun [14]. In comparison, the power density envisaged for a
hypothetical fusion reactor must be at least one million times larger.
The nucleus is bound by the very strong nuclear force, which acts against the repulsive electrostatic
force of the protons. Measurements have shown that the mass of the various atoms is almost 1% smaller
than the mass of the individual protons and neutrons combined. Following Einstein’s famous E = mc2
formula, this mass defect corresponds to a huge amount of energy, about 8 MeV (8 million eV) per nucleon.
This energy is liberated when one manages to fusion the different nucleons together. Starting from the
different hydrogen isotopes, e.g. one proton, deuterium (one proton plus one neutron) and tritium (one
proton plus two neutrons) a binding energy of up to a few MeV is found. Further fusion of these hydrogen
isotopes into the helium nucleus liberates another roughly 20 MeV.
Neutrons and protons in heavy atoms like uranium are less strongly bound than in lighter atoms like
iron and energy can be released in the fission of such heavy atoms. For example 1 MeV per nucleon, or
200 MeV in total, will be liberated in the fission process of U233, U235 and U238, each containing 92
protons and 141, 143 and 146 neutrons respectively. The energy liberated per fission reaction is at least
100 million times larger than in a chemical reaction.
It is therefore no wonder that this has created an enormous interest in subatomic physics and its
application for ultimate weapons or for the commercial use of energy.
2.2.1 Civilian and military use of nuclear energy, some remarks
The focus of this report is the commercial use of nuclear energy. As the evolution of nuclear energy has
always been strongly coupled with the military sector, we feel that a few remarks about the dangers of
nuclear weapons and the ambiguity of the commercial use of nuclear energy are needed. First of all,
governments wishing to have nuclear weapons were not faced with unsolvable problems related to the
development of fission bombs based on Pu239 and U235. This is especially true if nuclear physics and
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engineering know how had been built up under the umbrella of peaceful and commercial use of nuclear
fission energy.
Furthermore, it is interesting to notice that advocates of nuclear fission energy like to explain why
the dangers from nuclear weapons are far less important than believed. This is usually followed by the
statement that their praised future nuclear energy technology will avoid proliferation problems1.
For example it is often argued that U233 produced in a future Th232 breeding cycle will be useless
for nuclear weapons. This argument is certainly flawed as countries who want to have the nuclear weapon
capacity will most likely choose the simpler way to make a bomb using Pu239 or U235. Furthermore,
those who know how to breed and separate hundreds of kg’s of U233 can easily replace Th232 with U238
and produce a few tenth of kg of Pu239, sufficient to construct a few nuclear bombs.
Those not yet convinced about the ambiguity between the peaceful and military application of the
nuclear energy technology, should rethink their positions with respect to the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty,
the NPT, and to the “evil” government of Iran.
A careful reading of the treaty, [15], reveals that Iran, at least so far, is in agreement with the NPT
obligations. However one finds that NPT member countries should not exchange nuclear knowledge with
nuclear weapon countries outside the treaty. It is also worth remembering that the official nuclear weapon
states, Russia, USA, UK, France and China, have declared in the treaty their intention to eliminate nuclear
weapons as quickly as possible. Almost forty years after these countries signed the NPT, they still have
more than 20000 nuclear warheads.
The nuclear arms race at the end of the second world war and during the subsequent cold war is
well documented in many reports, books and movies and we refer to the extensive literature largely
available now on the internet. Especially for those who are not yet convinced about the dangers of
nuclear weapons, we would like to recommend the short youtube video on the largest explosion ever,
the 60 Megaton hydrogen bomb in Siberia in 1961, [16], and to Stanley Kubrics masterpiece movie “Dr.
Strangelove, or how I learned to stop worrying and love the bomb” from 1964 [17]. This film, even though
almost 50 years old, presents many still relevant ideas related to the 20000 remaining nuclear warheads.
2.3 Liberating the energy from nuclear fission and fusion
As we have seen in the previous section, a large amount of energy per reaction can be liberated from
the fusion of light elements and from the fission of heavy elements like uranium. However at least two
additional conditions must be fulfilled before such a process can be considered for energy production.
• In order to obtain a useful amount of energy from nuclear reactions a continuous and controllable
fission or fusion must be achieved for a large number of atoms. For example 1020 U235 atoms, (0.05
gr)2, need to be split every second in a 1 GWe nuclear fission reactor.
• Enough raw material must be continuously available to sustain this chain reaction.
Only three relevant isotopes fulfill these conditions for the nuclear fission process. These are the two
uranium isotopes U235 and U233 and the plutonium isotope Pu239. The energy liberated in the fission
process is carried dominantly (about 80%) by the two daughter atoms. This energy is relatively easily
transferred to a liquid or gas and the heat can be used to operate a generator.
The chain reaction is possible as each neutron induced fission reaction produces on average between
2-3 neutrons. As one neutron is needed to initiate another fission reaction, 1-2 excess neutrons minus some
inevitable losses are in principle available to increase the reactor power or perhaps to start a nuclear fuel
1A similar contradiction in the argumentation is found with respect to safety and radiation issues. The existing
nuclear power plants are claimed to be very safe and problems are small compared to many other dangers of
modern life. However, when the favorite future nuclear energy system is introduced, it is always pointed out that
the remaining risks will be further reduced by a large factor.
2This amount of U235 is found in 6 gr of natural uranium.
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breeding process. The introduction of neutron absorbers allows to control the reactivity of the nuclear
reaction and thus to increase or decrease the reactor power.
As we have seen in section 2.1, most of the large scale nuclear power plants of today comes from the
PWR’s (pressurized water reactors). They use dominantly U235 as primary reactor fuel. In these reactors
the prompt fission neutrons, with kinetic energies of 1 MeV, are slowed down (moderated) by elastic
collisions with the hydrogen nuclei in the water molecules to subeV kinetic energies. The nuclear fission
probability with such slow neutrons is increased by a factor of up to several hundred. As a consequence
a large reactor can be efficiently operated and controlled with a relatively low initial enrichment of U235
and large scale power production with moderated neutrons has been mastered by many countries. The
combined running experience of such large scale reactors, currently more than 13000 years, has resulted in
stable electric energy production combined with small or negligible risks during the “regular operation”3
up to an electric power output of more than 1 GWe.
In comparison the neutron escape rate in smaller reactors and in unmoderated fast reactors is much
higher. Therefore a chain reaction in FBR’s with comparable reactor power is more difficult to control
and a larger amount of initial fissile material with a higher density is needed. One consequence is that
the required technology to make such highly enriched nuclear fuel will always be faced with the problem
of its dual use for bomb making.
The use of the excess neutrons for the transformation of the U238 and Th232 isotopes into fissile
Pu239 and U233 looks very interesting as the amount of fissile material could be increased theoretically
by a factor of more than one hundred. The breeding reactions considered would use the excess neutrons
according the two reactions:
U23892 + n→ U
239
92 (β
− decay) → Np23993 (β
− decay) → Pu23994 and
Th23290 + n→ Th
233
90 (β
− decay) → Pa23391 (β
− decay)→ U23392
Some advantages and disadvantages for the U238 → Pu239 and the Th232 → U233 breeding cycles
and some practical problems are listed in Table 2. Some of these problems and their proposed solutions
will be discussed in detail in section 3 and 4 of this report. So far only little or no experience exists with
large scale GWe breeder prototypes.
We now turn to the fusion process. Nuclear fusion can happen once the short range nuclear force
between nucleons becomes larger than the electrostatic repulsive force between two positively charged
nuclei. This can happen if the protons involved either have large kinetic energies or if the protons are
compressed by super large gravitational fields as observed in stars. Very high kinetic energies correspond
to nucleus temperatures of many ten to hundred million degrees. Such high kinetic energies can be
obtained for example in accelerators but only for small numbers. Larger amounts of fusion reactions can
be obtained in special magnetic field arrangements.
It follows from first principles that the sometimes discussed “cold fusion” reaction is in contradiction
with our well established knowledge of subatomic physics. As the repulsive force increases with the number
of protons involved, the conditions to achieve fusion with atoms heavier than hydrogen and its isotopes
become more and more difficult. It follows that fusion reactions based for example on the “proton-boron”
reaction and many others are only possible using accelerators. Ideas to use accelerators for continuous
fusion reactions with commercially interesting GW power prove to be wishful thinking once the required
amount of 1021 fusion reactions per second is considered. The very low efficiency for transforming electric
energy into kinetic energy of proton beams poses another fundamental problem for such exotic ideas.
The probability for a fusion reaction depends on the product of the plasma temperature and the fusion
reaction cross section. The deuterium-tritium fusion is a factor of 100 to 1000 easier to achieve than the
next two fusion reactions of deuterium and He32 and deuterium-deuterium respectively. As it is already
extremely difficult to achieve even the lowest interesting plasma temperatures on the required large scale,
3The possibility to operate all reactors and for a long time under regular safe conditions is questioned by many.
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Problems and Advantages U238 → Pu239 breeding Th232 → U233 breeding
average concentration (earth crust) 2-3 ppm 10 ppm
raw material availability today up to 2 million tons U238 a few 1000-10000 tons(?)
existing mining about 40000 tons/year about 1000 tons/year(?)
computer based simulations no major problems no major problems
max theoretical breeding gain (if initiated with PU239) 0.7 0.45
required neutron spectrum fast (prompt MeV neutrons) fast to slow
half life of intermediate state NP239 (2.3 days half life) Pa233 (27.4 days)
intermediate neutron absorbers small (?) large (Pa233)
prototype experience small scale to large scale (one) small scale
large scale operational experience (one) “limited” none
breeding gain (reactor conditions) unclear (not 100% public) 0.013 (after 5 years)
initial fission start up U235 or Pu239 U233, U235 or Pu239
fissile material fraction ≥ 20% ≥ 20%
reactor cost relative to PWR huge comparable(?)
reactor lifetime relative to PWR small (so far) comparable(?)
Table 2: A qualitative comparison of the fissile breeding cycles with U238 and Th232. The
breeding gain is defined as the ratio of C−D
F
where C, D and F are the number of fissile atoms
created, destroyed and fissioned. In order to be called a breeder, more fissile material must be made
than fissioned, and the breeding gain must be larger than zero. The “(?)” indicates guesstimate
as good information has so far not been found by the author.
it follows that the only possible fusion reaction under reactor conditions is the deuterium-tritium fusion
into helium (He42).
An additional advantage of this reaction is the fact that the produced additional neutron carries 14
MeV of the liberated energy of almost 18 MeV per fusion reaction out of the plasma zone. Thus, in
theory, it can be imagined that the 4 MeV carried by the helium nucleus are used to keep the plasma
temperature high enough and that the neutron energy is transferred somehow to another cooling medium.
This medium is imagined to transfer the heat to a generator.
Unfortunately tritium is unstable, its half life is only 12.3 years, and it does not exist in sizable
amounts on our planet. It must therefore be produced in a breeding process. A possible chain reaction
could follow this scheme:
H21 +H
3
1 → He
4
2+ 1 neutron
neutron +Li63 → He
4
2 +H
3
1
In comparison to the breeding and energy extraction in fission reactions, at least three additional
fundamental problems can be identified for the fusion process.
• A sustained super high temperature, at least 10 million degrees, is required in order to have fusion
reactions happening at an interesting rate. Such high temperatures can be achieved in some special
magnetic field arrangements or in a tiny volume with very intense laser or particle beams. Unfor-
tunately no material is known which can survive the intense neutron flux under sustained reactor
conditions and the sometimes occurring plasma eruptions.
• It is difficult to transfer the energy from the 14 MeV neutron to a gas or a liquid without neutron
losses.
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• The considered breeding reaction requires essentially that 100% of the produced neutrons must be
used to make tritium. As this is even theoretically impossible some additional nuclear reactions are
proposed where heavier nucleons act as neutron multipliers. However so far, even the most optimistic
and idealized theoretical calculations have failed to produce neutrons in sufficient numbers.
In short, the accumulated knowledge today indicates that the proposed fusion reaction is unsustainable
and can not lead to a sustainable power production. This statement will be strengthened with more details
in section 5.
2.4 Dangers related to radioactive material
We will conclude this section with some issues related to radioactive elements produced and liberated in
the use of nuclear energy and the related dangers from ionizing radiation. First of all, there are three
types of radioactive decays, producing α, β and γ radiation. In addition, cosmic rays and various particles
produced in high energy physics experiments should also be considered as a potential radiation hazard.
The damage to cells is related to the ionizing potential or the energy deposit per volume originating
from a source. The hazard is usually split into high and low radiation dose effects. Very high radiation
dose and the corresponding energy deposit result in fast cell death. If large and concentrated enough,
the result can be the destruction of vital organs and death. It is important to know that the careless use
of radiation during the early days of nuclear physics and its applications, have resulted in relatively high
cancer rates among the participating scientists and engineers [18].
The more tricky and less understood damage comes from small dose and long term effects to the cell
DNA. While some self repair mechanism to broken DNA exists, it is also known that a single unlucky hit
by a cosmic ray can transform the normal DNA into a cancer developing DNA, resulting many years later
in the death of the host. It follows that the importance of small radiation doses for the development of
a particular cancer types and in comparison to many other causes like smoking and asbestos is difficult
to quantify. As a result, the associated cancer risks from small radiation doses will continue to fuel the
emotional debate about nuclear energy for a long time.
Despite these uncertainties, today the precautionary principle is used in many countries and very
strict rules for people working in a radiation environment are applied. These rules are often summarized
under the name ALARA (as low as reasonable achievable). The goal to reduce any radiation exposure
to essentially negligible levels is one of the most important occupations of a radiation safety group. As
a result of these efforts, assuming that expensive protection measures are taken, the health risks from
radioactive contamination and under “normal operation” conditions are often much smaller than risks
associated with working hazards in many other industrial domains. However, time pressure and profit
optimization will always be in contradiction with the ever strengthened safety regulations.
It is also known that it is essentially impossible to guarantee the “normal operation” of the nuclear
industry with its accumulating waste over periods of hundreds and sometimes even thousands of years. A
solution to these problems is, as with similar long term problems of our industrial growth based societies,
left for future generations.
3 Experience with real breeder reactors
Breeder reactors are based on the beautiful idea that only one neutron, out of the 2.5 neutrons on average
from the fission of U235 and U233 (and 2.9 neutrons from Pu239), is required to keep the chain reaction
going. It can thus be imagined, even if some neutron losses are allowed, that the additional neutrons can
be used to make more nuclear fuel from U238 or Th232 than fissioned. Accordingly a reactor is defined
as a breeder reactor if more fissile material is produced than consumed.
The number of free neutrons per fission reaction is η = (σf/σa)× v, where σf is the neutron induced
fission cross section and σa the neutron absorption (the sum of the neutron capture and fission) cross
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section and ν is the average number of prompt fission neutrons [19]. The fission to capture ratio and thus
η depend on the neutron energy and the different possible isotopes. As one neutron is required to sustain
the chain reaction, breeding is only possible if η is larger than 2. This condition is found for Pu239, U235
and U233 fission where η for prompt fast fission neutrons is 2.7, 2.3 and 2.45 respectively. For thermal
(moderated) neutrons U233 has the highest η value of 2.3 followed by 2.11 for Pu239 and 2.07 for U235.
Some Pu239 fuel production happens also in standard PWR reactors. Depending on the reactor and
fuel design characteristics as well as the amount of remaining fissile fuel in the reactor, up to 30% and
more of the produced energy comes from the secondary Pu239 fission.
Two theoretical breeder options exist:
• The use of thermal neutrons and the Th232 as input breeding material.
• The use of fast prompt neutrons dominantly from Pu239 fission, thus the name fast reactor, with
U238 as the breeding material.
The use of the Th232→U233 cycle seems, at least on the first view, more attractive. The reaction
can happen in the high fission cross section domain using moderated neutrons. The fission process with
moderated neutrons is well understood, relatively easy to control and already in use with the standard
nuclear water moderated reactors. It seems that in principle one only needs sufficient amounts of U233
mixed with Th232 in order to start such a reactor and keep on going. Some of the remaining technical
obstacles will be discussed in section 4.4.
For the U238→Pu239 breeder cycle one has to operate the fission process, either starting with U235
or Pu239, in the low fission cross section domain. As a consequence such reactors have to be operated
with highly enriched U235 (HEU) or Pu239 fuel. Thus, one is not only confronted with special safety
conditions for a large amount of ”bomb” making material but also with a huge amount of fissile material
which could under certain conditions reach the critical mass resulting in an uncontrolled chain reaction
followed by a nuclear meltdown. Furthermore, the cooling of the active reactor zone has to be done
with a low neutron absorption cross section and a high thermal conducting material like liquid sodium.
Unfortunately, sodium is chemically very active and can easily burn in contact with oxygen.
3.1 The Shippingport LWBR thorium reactor
The experience with the thorium breeder cycle comes mainly from research at the US Shippingport
reactor, rated with a net power of 0.060 GWe. This reactor operated during the ’60s, ’70s and ’80s. In
1965 the Atomic Energy Commission started designing the uranium-233/thorium core for the reactor.
The reactor was operated as a LWBR between August 1977 and October 1982.
According to the documentation, the reactor was started with a highly enriched 98% U233 inventory
of 501 kg and a total of 42260 kg of Th232 [20]. No details are given about the origin of the 501 kg of
U233. However, one can assume that it came from a standard U235 fission reactor, where excess neutrons
can be used to transform Th232 (or U238) blankets into U233 (or Pu239).
The reactor had a maximum thermal power of 0.2366 MW(therm) and was operated for 29047 effective
full hours, or about 66% of the time. After five years of operation, a very detailed analysis of the fuel
elements was performed. It was found that the total U233 inventory had increased to 507.5 kg, a factor
of 1.013. While it is impressive that the reactor could be operated and fueled with Th232 over a period
of 5 years, the U233 gain was only about 6 kg of fissile material.
Assuming that such a reactor could eventually produce the U233 starting fuel for other reactors, one
has to wait for quite some time before the second package of initial reactor core has been produced. Some
large technological breakthroughs are required before this chain can be called feasible on a large scale.
The documents do not say much about the contamination of the 507.5 kg of U233 with fission products
and its usefulness for further studies after this five year experiment. The fact that no subsequent reactor
experiment has been performed might provide a partial answer to this question.
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Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the initial concentration of fissile material in a reactor with
only 0.237 GW(therm) energy was very large. It can be estimated that this amount, placed in a standard
PWR, could have produced at least 5 times more electric energy than it had during the actual experiment.
In contrast to the experiments performed at the Shippingport reactor, where the initial core was
already U233, a realistic Th232 reactor cycle must be started with an initial U235 or Pu239 core. Con-
sequently, the experience gained with the Shippingport reactor experiment can not be considered as a
proof that the envisaged system can function. It follows that many more tests are needed before one can
imagine constructing a functioning large scale prototype Th232 breeder reactor.
3.2 Experience with Fast Reactors
For the purpose of this report, the future of nuclear energy, we are mainly interested in the situation with
the most important aspect, the question of the fuel breeding option. Unfortunately very little information
is provided for the experimental breeding achievements and most reports present the theoretical design
breeding ratios. For example the breeding ratio for the FBR Phenix reactor in France is given in many
textbooks as 1.14[21]. This number corresponds however to the theoretical design and it seems that
a detailed experimental analysis, like the one done for the Th232 to U233 cycle and the Shippingport
reactor, is either secret or has not been performed.
Despite the missing experimental data of achieved breeding gains, the IAEA document, [22], about the
FBR core characteristics provides useful information about the design of such reactors. In this document
a large number of FBR reactors, separated into (1) experimental Fast Reactors, (2) Demonstration of
Prototype Fast reactors and (3) Commercial Size Reactors, are presented.
The breeding gain, defined as the ratio of C−D
F
where C, D and F are the number of fissile atoms
created, destroyed and fissioned, and other characteristics of different fast reactors are summarized in
Table 3.
FR name nominal Power [GW] fissile material core enrichment design
(operation years) therm elec U235 [kg] Pu239∗∗ [kg] inner core breeding gain
Experimental Fast Reactors
Joyo 0.14 - 110 160 30% 0.03
Fermi 0.20 0.061 484 0 25.6% 0.16
Demonstration or Prototype Fast Reactors
Phenix 0.563 0.255 35 931 18.0% 0.16
SNR-300 0.762 0.327 57 1536 25.0% 0.10
PFBR∗ 1.250 0.500 17.3 1978 20.7% 0.05
Monju 0.714 0.280 13.5 1400 16.0% 0.2
BN-600 1.470 0.600 2020 112 17.0% -0.15
Commercial Size Fast Reactors
Super Phenix 2.990 1.242 142 5780 16.0% 0.18
BN-800∗ 2.100 0.870 30 2710 19.5% -0.02
Standard Water Moderated Reactors
standard PWR 3. 1. 3500 0∗∗∗ 3-4% -0.7
Table 3: Some design values for the three groups of Fast Reactors, experimental, demonstration or
prototype and commercial size [22]. Reactors marked with a “∗” are currently under construction.
The design numbers can be compared with the ones of existing large commercial 1 GWe PWR
reactors, assuming an average charge of 500 tons of natural equivalent, given in the last line. The
“∗∗” and “∗∗∗” stand for a mixture of different plutonium isotopes dominated by Pu239 and the
amount within the initial core respectively.
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It is very unfortunate that experimental breeding gains are not given in the IAEA fast reactor data
base. In absence of any detailed publication, one can assume that the required detailed and very expensive
isotope analysis of the reactor fuel has not been performed or published. The theoretical hopes for fuel
breeding are thus not backed up with hard experimental data. Nevertheless, already the theoretical
breeding gains of the different FBR’s are revealing. Ten out of the twelve small experimental reactors
were operated in a configuration not for breeding. The other two experimental reactors, listed in
Table 3, are the Joyo in Japan and the Fermi in the USA. The Joyo reactor was not designed for the
production of electric energy. The Fermi reactor operated for a few years and had a partial core meltdown
in 1966. This reactor was the first and only effort in the USA to operate a larger scale breeder reactor
and was terminated in 1972.
Another twelve Demonstration or Prototype reactors are listed in the IAEA report. Among them are
the Monju reactor in Japan, the “Russian/Soviet” BN-600 and the Phenix reactor in France.
Only the BN-600 reactor is currently operational and is often considered as the prime example of a
successful operating FBR reactor. However, the IAEA document reveals that this reactor was designed
with a negative breeding gain of -0.15.
In comparison, the Phenix and Monju reactors are presented with a theoretical breeding gain of 0.16
and 0.2. It is interesting to note that the potential better construction of the next generation PFBR
reactor in India, currently expected to start in 2011, is given with a much smaller theoretical breeding
gain of 0.05.
The third FBR group in the IAEA document describes commercial size reactors. Eleven out of
the listed thirteen large FBR’s projects have been abandoned before any construction plans have been
presented, or “exist” currently only in the design phase. Only one reactor, the Super Phenix reactor in
France, has produced some electric energy. During its short operation time it was operated with a very
low efficiency and it can not be considered as a successful breeder prototype. A new commercial size fast
reactor is under construction in Russia. The BN-800 is currently scheduled to become operational during
the year 2014. It is however quantified with a negative breeding gain of -0.02.
A further confirmation that the BN-800 reactor is not a breeder comes from WNA document, [23],
where the reactor is described as:
“It has improved features including fuel flexibility - U+Pu nitride, MOX, or metal, and with breeding
ratio up to 1.3. However, during the plutonium disposition campaign it will be operated with a breeding
ratio of less than one. ”
A possible interpretation of this statement could be that plutonium stocks are already a delicate
problem and that Russia wants to get rid of it.
In summary, the IAEA data base for fast reactors does not present any evidence that a positive breed-
ing gain has been obtained with past and present FBR reactors. On the contrary, the presented data
indicate at best that a more efficient nuclear fuel use than in standard PWR reactors can be achieved
during normal running conditions. However, once the short and inefficient running times of FBR’s, in
comparison with large scale PWR’s, are taken into account, even this better fuel use has not been demon-
strated. In fact, the required initial fuel load in FBR’s contains at least twice as much natural uranium
equivalent and with a fissile material enrichment of roughly 5 times larger than that in a comparable
PWR. A fair comparison of the fuel efficiency should include the efficiency to recycle fissile material from
used nuclear fuel in both reactor types.
Three more areas of concern for a future breeder program should be added:
• Fast Reactors are known for a worrying safety record. For example, it might be true that serious
incidents, like the one that happened with the Chernobyl graphite moderated reactor, can not
happen with modern PWR’s. However, only very few nuclear experts would sign such a statement
for sodium cooled FBR’s.
• FBR’s are known for their huge construction costs relative to PWR’s and it might be tempting to
compare some of the past FBR’s to a monetary “black hole”. An equivalent of 3.5 billion Euros has
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been invested in the construction of the SNR-300 in Germany. Because of safety concerns related
to sodium leaks and other problems, this small FBR has never started operation. This amount of
money corresponds to the price tag for a five times more powerful modern PWR reactor.
• A third problem is related to the FBR requirements to have a large inventory of fissile material
combined with a high purity. The amount of fissile material listed in Table 3 should be compared to
a few kg required for a Pu239 bomb. This problem makes even small experimental reactors highly
sensitive to the proliferation problem.
4 Future Breeder Reactors
As our short overview in section 2 has already demonstrated, neither sodium cooled FBR reactors based
on U238→ Pu239 nor the Th232→ U233 cycle are fashinable commercial reactor types.
As a consequence of the observation that known uranium deposits are limited, scientists from many
countries have joined forces and created during the year 2001 the Generation IV reactor forum [24].
Within their own words (quote):
“The Generation IV International Forum, or GIF, was chartered in July 2001 to lead the collaborative
efforts of the world’s leading nuclear technology nations to develop next generation nuclear energy systems
to meet the world’s future energy needs.”
The work of over 100 experts from ten countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Canada, France, Japan,
Republic of Korea, South Africa, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, and from the
International Atomic Energy Agency and the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency has resulted at the end of
the year 2002 into a roadmap document with the title:
A Technology Roadmap for Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems
After the definition of the goals, identifying promising concepts, their evaluation and the estimation
of the required R&D efforts, six systems have been selected. The selection was based on their estimation
that they (quote)
“feature increased safety, improved economics for electricity production and new products such as
hydrogen for transportation applications, reduced nuclear wastes for disposal, and increased proliferation
resistance.”
Within the content of this analysis we are mainly interested whether the acknowledged U235 fuel
shortages can be solved with future breeder reactors. Therefore we will only take a closer look at the
three FBR’s and the one which has the potential to become a Th232 based thermal breeder. According
to the WNA document from August 2009 [25]:
“at least four of the systems have significant operating experience already in most respects of their
design, which provides a good basis for further R&D and is likely to mean that they can be in commercial
operation well before 2030.”
It is remarkable that the same WNA document contradicts this statement a few lines later:
“However, it is significant that to address non-proliferation concerns, the fast neutron reactors are
not conventional fast breeders, i.e. they do not have a blanket assembly where plutonium-239 is produced.
Instead, plutonium production takes place in the core, where burn-up is high and the proportion of pluto-
nium isotopes other than Pu-239 remains high. In addition, new reprocessing technologies will enable the
fuel to be recycled without separating the plutonium.”
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4.1 Some details about Generation IV breeder reactors
The Generation IV roadmap document from the year 2002 describes a detailed planning for what needs
to be achieved during the next 10-20 years. Depending on the results one might be able to decide which
of the different future reactor concepts can be used to construct real prototype FBR’s.
The qualitative proposed research plans for the three FBR’s and the Th232 reactor can be summarized
as follows:
• The Gas-Cooled Fast Reactor System (GFR). This concept is based on a helium-cooled reactor
with a small thermal power of roughly 0.5 GW only. A large number of major technological gaps
are mentioned in the Roadmap leading to a research program of about 20 years and a cost of 940
million US dollars.
• The Lead-cooled Fast Reactor System (LFR) with a possible thermal power between 0.1 GW and
3.6 GW. A relatively long list of ”technology gaps” for the LFR is presented, including even some
insufficient knowledge of neutron interaction cross sections. A 15-20 year R&D program with a
price tag of 990 million US dollars is needed before any further statements about the realization of
this concept can be made.
• The Sodium-Cooled Fast Reactor System (SFR) with a thermal power rating between 1-5 GW.
This concept is closely related to the doubtful success with past sodium cooled fast reactors in
France, Japan, Germany, the UK, Russia and the United States. It is said that this reactor must
be capable of also using the thermal neutron spectrum, because the startup fuel for the fast reactor
must come ultimately from spent thermal reactor fuel. The list of technology gaps includes the need
to ensure a “passive safe response design basis”, the “capital cost reduction” and the “proof that
a reactor has the ability to accommodate bounding events”. A somewhat frightening conclusion of
this statement might be that previous sodium prototype FBR’s did not fulfill any of these basic
reactor safety standards.
It is also mentioned that this sodium cooled reactor is the most advanced FBR system. The required
R&D program to investigate the remaining problems could be done over a period of less than 15
years and for 610 million US dollar.
• The Molten Salt Reactor system (MSR) is imagined as 1 GWe reactor with a net thermal efficiency
of 44-50%. The design assumes the use either U238 or Th232 as a fertile fuel dissolved as fluorides
in the molten salt and that it can operate with thorium as a thermal breeder. The technology gaps
mentioned contain a large number of items related to the chemistry of molten salts as well as the
need for more accurate basic neutron cross sections for compositions of molten salt. The time scale
of the required R&D program is 15-20 years with an associated price tag of 1000 million dollars.
The Generation IV Roadmap document can be summarized with the statement that the known tech-
nological gaps to construct even prototype breeder reactors were enormous at the time when the document
was written. These unknowns are addressed with a detailed planning for the required research projects
and the associated cost. Only after these problems have been solved a design and construction of expen-
sive prototype breeder reactors can start.
We are now at the end of the year 2009 and almost half the originally planned R&D period is over.
Essentially no progress results have been presented and the absence of large funding during the past
8 years gives little confidence that even the most basic questions for the entire Generation IV reactors
program can be answered during the next few years. Thus, it seems that the Generation IV roadmap is
already totally outdated and unrealistic.
This is confirmed by the latest statements at the Global 2009 conference in September 2009 by B.
Bigot, the chairman of the French Atomic Energy Commission, which indicate that the plan to have
14
the reactors ready by the year 2030 is now delayed to 2040 and onwards. According to the Website
”supporters of nuclear energy” Bigot said ”from 2040 onwards, France was planning to use Generation
IV FBRs when renewing its fleet.” [26].
4.2 The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP)
Another initiative, the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), [27], was announced by President
Bush in his 2006 State of the Union address in 2006. In September 2007, all major nuclear energy
countries, besides Germany and a few others have signed the statement of principles. According to the
U.S. Department of Energy the goals of the initiative are (quote):
“First, reduce Americas dependence on foreign sources of fossil fuels and encourage economic growth.
Second, recycle nuclear fuel using new proliferation-resistant technologies to recover more energy and re-
duce waste. Third, encourage prosperity growth and clean development around the world. And fourth,
utilize the latest technologies to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation worldwide.”
However, in June 2009 the U.S. Department of Energy announced that it is no longer pursuing do-
mestic commercial reprocessing, and had largely halted the domestic GNEP program. Research would
continue on proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and waste management.
According to the WNA press information, [28], the status of this initiative is:
“Although the future of GNEP looks uncertain, with its budget having been cut to zero, the DoE will
continue to study proliferation-resistant fuel cycles and waste management strategies. ”
It follows that the GNEP initiative will not result in the construction of future breeder reactors.
4.3 Ideas about using thorium as a reactor fuel
During the past years a large number of articles and books, websites and blogs propose the use of
thorium as the breeder material for future nuclear reactors [29]. The promoters advocate many interesting
possibilities which indicate that the Th232 cycle might have lots of advantages compared to the U238
breeder cycles in FBR’s.
The main problem with these wonderful new insights into the use of nuclear fission energy seems to
be that nobody from the nuclear energy establishment is interested.
As a result, little or no private and public research money is invested into the question of how to
develop a thorium breeder reactor. Ignoring the possibility that past investigations into the thorium fuel
cycle have revealed several important problems, one needs to speculate about other reasons.
• That the established nuclear energy experts do not like to see competition from outsiders.
• That the nuclear fusion community has managed to dominate the entire nuclear energy research
domain and that the research budgets are already allocated to the ITER plasma research project.
If these two possibilities contain some truth, those in favor of developing a thorium breeder reactor
should start taking a strong position against the current nuclear energy establishment. They should
point out that (1) the current use of nuclear energy has no perspective because of the limited amount of
available uranium resources, (2) the Th232 breeder cycle is by orders of magnitude better than the ideas
about U238 breeder cycles with FBR’s and (3) nuclear fusion is at least 50-100 years away. Leaving these
more political issues aside, we would like to repeat some rational statements and the otherwise rarely
mentioned problems about the use of the Th232 breeder cycle from the WNA information article [30]:
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Developing a thorium-based fuel cycle.
“In one significant respect U-233 is better than uranium-235 and plutonium-239, because of its higher
neutron yield per neutron absorbed. Given a start with some other fissile material (U-233, U-235 or Pu-
239) as a driver, a breeding cycle similar to but more efficient than that with U-238 and plutonium (in
normal, slow neutron reactors) can be set up. (The driver fuels provide all the neutrons initially, but are
progressively supplemented by U-233 as it forms from the thorium.) However, there are also features of the
neutron economy which counter this advantage. In particular the intermediate product protactinium-233
(Pa-233) is a neutron absorber which diminishes U-233 yield.”
The statement continues with:
“Despite the thorium fuel cycle having a number of attractive features, development has always run into
difficulties.” The main attractive features are:
• The possibility of utilizing a very abundant resource which has hitherto been of so little interest that
it has never been quantified properly.
• The production of power with few long-lived transuranic elements in the waste.
• Reduced radioactive wastes generally.
The problems include:
• The high cost of fuel fabrication, due partly to the high radioactivity of U-233 chemically separated
from the irradiated thorium fuel.
• Separated U-233 is always contaminated with traces of U-232 (69 year half-life but whose daughter
products such as thallium-208 are strong gamma emitters with very short half-lives). Although this
confers proliferation resistance to the fuel cycle, it results in increased costs.
• The similar problems in recycling thorium itself due to highly radioactive Th-228 (an alpha emitter
with two-year half life) present.
• Some concern over weapons proliferation risk of U-233 (if it could be separated on its own), although
many designs such as the Radkowsky Thorium Reactor address this concern. The technical problems
(not yet satisfactorily solved) in reprocessing solid fuels. However, with some designs, in particular
the molten salt reactor (MSR), these problems are likely to largely disappear.
• Much development work is still required before the thorium fuel cycle can be commercialized, and
the effort required seems unlikely while (or where) abundant uranium is available. In this respect,
recent international moves to bring India into the ambit of international trade might result in the
country ceasing to persist with the thorium cycle, as it now has ready access to traded uranium and
conventional reactor designs.
The WNA article concludes with the following diplomatic statement:
“Nevertheless, the thorium fuel cycle, with its potential for breeding fuel without the need for fast
neutron reactors, holds considerable potential in the long-term. It is a significant factor in the long-term
sustainability of nuclear energy.”
A “logic” interpretation of the WNA statement and the list of arguments about thorium and within
the context of our review could be:
• The breeding of Pu239 with fast neutrons has huge problems and it would be great if another
nuclear fuel could be found.
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• Thorium breeding has an interesting potential if the remaining large number of problems can be
mastered in the long term, but right now we are far away from this. The contamination with the
strong neutron absorber Pa233 and the large radioactivity from U232 and other elements are chief
among the currently unsolved problems.
• The well known use of nuclear fission energy in PWR’s is unsustainable. The problems related to
long-lived transuranic elements, e.g. plutonium and heavier elements as well as nuclear waste in
general are unsolved. The concern with nuclear weapon proliferation can not be solved either.
5 Fusion Illusions
This section is a short version of a detailed article by the author in the second edition of the “The Final
Energy Crisis” [31].
After the second world war, many nuclear pioneers expected that nuclear fusion would provide their
grandchildren with cheap, clean and essentially unlimited energy.
Generations of physicists and physics teachers have been taught at the university, and have gone on to
teach others, a) that progress made in fusion research is impressive, b) that controlled fusion is probably
only a few decades away and c) that - given sufficient public funding - no major obstacles stand between
us and success in this field.
Here are some quotes from physics textbooks that reflect this sort of optimism:
“The goal seems to be visible now” (Nuclear and Particle Physics; Frauenfelder and Henley 1974)
“It will most likely take until the year 2000 to bring a laboratory reactor to full commercial utilization”
(Energy, Resources and Policy; R. Dorf 1978)
“As the construction of a fusion reactor implies a large number of unsolved practical problems, one
can not expect that fusion will become a usable energy resource during some decades! Within a longer
time scale however it seems possible!” (Physics, P. A. Tipler 1991)
Obviously this has not happened yet; the fusion optimists have become more modest saying “if
everything goes well, the first commercial fusion reactor prototype might be ready in 50 years from now”.
Such a statements only hide the fact that today we have no idea how to solve the remaining problems.
The uncritical media of today waxed enthusiastically about the recent decision by the “world’s leaders”
to provide the ten billion dollars needed to start the ITER fusion project [32]. During the past few years
one could read, for example[33]:
• “If succesful, ITER would provide mankind with an unlimited source of energy” (Novosti, 15. Nov.
2005).
• “Officials project that 10% to 20% of the world energy could come from fusion by the end of the
century” (BBC news 24 May 2006).
• “If succesful, it could provide a source of energy that is clean and limitless.” and “ITER says within
30 years, the electricity could be available on the grid!” (BBC news 21. Nov. 2006).
The public, worried about global warming and oil price explosions, seems to welcome the tacit message
that “we - the fusion scientists, the engineers, and the politicians - do everything that needs to be done
to bring fusion energy on line before fossil fuel supplies become an issue, and before global warming boils
us all.”
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In what follows we challenge the assumption that the ITER project has any relation to the energy
problem and we quantify the arguments of fusion sceptics.
We start our discussion with an overview of the remaining huge problems facing commercial fusion
and give a detailed description of why the imagined self-sufficient tritium breeding cycle can not work.
In fact, as we are about to see, it seems that enough knowledge has been accumulated on this subject to
safely conclude that whatever might justify the 10 billion dollar ITER project, it is not energy research.
5.1 Remaining barriers to fusion energy
Producing electricity from controlled nuclear fusion would require overcoming at least four major obstacles.
The removal of each obstacle would need major scientific breakthroughs before any reasonable expectation
might be formed of building a commercial prototype fusion reactor. It should be alarming that at best
only the problems concerning the plasma control, described in point one below, might be investigated
within the scope of the ITER project. Where and how the others might be dealt with is anyone’s guess.
These are the four barriers:
1. Commercial energy production requires steady state fusion conditions for a deuterium-tritium
plasma on a scale comparable to that of today’s standard nuclear fission reactors with outputs
of 1 GW (electric) and about 3 GW(thermal) power. The current ITER proposal foresees a ther-
mal power of only 0.4 GW using a plasma volume of 840 m3. Originally it was planned to build
ITER with a plasma volume of 2000 m3 corresponding to a thermal fusion power of 1.5 GW, but
the fusion community soon realized that the original ITER version would never receive the required
funding. Thus a smaller, much less ambitious version of the ITER project was proposed and finally
accepted in 2005.
The 1 GW(el) fission reactors of today function essentially in a steady state operation at nominal
power and with an availability time over an entire year of roughly 90%. The deuterium-tritium
fusion experiments have so far achieved short pulses of fusion power of 15 MW(therm) for one
second and 4 MW(therm) for 5 seconds corresponding to a liberated thermal energy of 5 kWh [34]
The Q value - produced energy over input energy - for these pulses was 0.65 and 0.2 respectively.
If everything works according to the latest plans [35], it will be 2018 when the first plasma ex-
periments can start with ITER. From there it will take us to 2026, at least another eight years,
before the first tritium experiments are tried4. In other words it will take at best 20 years from the
agreement by the world’s richest countries to construct ITER before one can find out if the goals
of ITER, a power output of 0.5 GW(therm) with a Q value of up to 10 and for 400 seconds, are
realistic. Compare that to the original ITER proposal which was 1.5 GW(therm), with a Q value
between 10-15 and for about 10000 seconds. ITER proponents explain that the achievement of this
goal would already be an enormous success. But this goal, even if it can be achieved by 2026, pales
in comparison with the requirements of steady state operation, year after year, with only a few
minor controlled interruptions.
Previous deuterium-tritium experiments used only minor quantities of tritium and yet lengthy
interruptions between successive experiments were required because the radiation from the tritium
decay was so excessively high. In earlier fusion experiments, such as JET, the energy liberated
in the short pulses came from burning (fusing) about 3 micrograms (3 × 10−6 grams) of tritium,
starting from a total amount of 20 gr of tritium. This number should be compared with the few
kilograms of tritium required to perform the experiments foreseen during the entire ITER lifetime
and still greater quantities that would be required for a commercial fusion reactor. A 400 sec fusion
pulse with a power of 0.5 GW corresponds to the burning of 0.035 gr (3.5× 10−2 grams) of tritium.
4The original plans from 2005 are now, even before any serious construction has started, already delayed by four
years.
18
A very large number when compared to 3 micrograms, but a tiny number when compared with the
yearly burning of 55.6 kilograms of tritium in a commercial 1 GW(therm) fusion reactor.
The achieved efficiency of the tritium burning (i.e., the amount that is burned divided by the total
amount required to achieve the fusion pulse) was roughly 1 part in a million in the JET experiment
and is expected to be about the same in the ITER experiments, far below any acceptable value if
one wants to burn 55.6 kg of tritium per year.
Moreover, in a steady state operation the deuterium-tritium plasma will be “contaminated” with
the helium nucleus that is produced and some instabilities can be expected. Thus a plasma cleaning
routine is needed that would not cause noticeable interruptions of production in a commercial fusion
plant. ITER proponents know that even their self-defined goal (a 400 second long deuterium-tritium
fusion operation within the relatively small volume of 840 m3) presents a great challenge. One might
wonder what they think about the difficulties involved in reaching steady state operation for a full
scale fusion power plant.
2. The material that surrounds and contains thousands of cubic meters of plasma in a full-scale fusion
reactor has to fulfill two requirements. First, it has to survive an extremely high neutron flux with
energies of 14 MeV, and second, it has to do this not for a few minutes but for many years. It has
been estimated that in a full-scale fusion power plant the neutron flux will be at least 10-20 times
larger than in today’s state of the art nuclear fission power plants. Since the neutron energy is also
higher, it has been estimated that -with such a neutron flux - each atom in the solid surrounding
the plasma will be displaced 475 times over a period of 5 years [36]. Second, to further complicate
matters, the material in the so called first wall (FW) around the plasma will need to be very thin,
in order to minimize inelastic neutron collisions resulting in the loss of neutrons (for more details
see next section), yet at the same time thick enough so that it can resist both the normal and the
accidental collisions from the 100-million-degree hot plasma and for years.
The “erosion” for carbon-like materials from the neutron bombardment has been estimated to be
about 3 mm per “burn” year and even for materials like tungsten it has been estimated to be about
0.1 mm per burn year [36].
In short, no material known today can even come close to meeting the requirements described
above. Exactly how a material that meets these requirements could be designed and tested remains
a mystery, because tests with such extreme neutron fluxes can not be performed either at ITER or
at any other existing or planned facility.
3. The radioactive decay of even a few grams of tritium creates radiation dangerous to living organisms,
such that those who work with it must take sophisticated protective measures. Moreover, tritium
is chemically identical to ordinary hydrogen and as such very active and difficult to contain. Since
tritium is also a necessary ingredient in hydrogen fusion bombs, there is additional risk that it
might be stolen. So, handling even few kg of tritium foreseen for ITER is likely to create major
headaches both for the radiation protection group and for those concerned with the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
Both of these challenges are essentially ignored in the ITER proposal and the only thing the
protection groups have to work with today are design studies based on computer simulations.
This may not be of concern to the majority of ITER’s promoters today, since they will be retiring
before the tritium problem starts in something like 10 to 15 years from now [37]. But at some point
it will become a greater challenge also for ITER and especially once one starts to work on a real
fusion experiment with many tens of kilograms of tritium.
4. Problems related to tritium supply and self-sufficient tritium breeding will be discussed in detail in
section 5.2. But first it will be useful to describe qualitatively two problems that seem to require
simultaneous miracles if they are to be solved.
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• The neutrons produced in the fusion reaction will be emitted essentially isotropically in all
directions around the fusion zone. These neutrons must somehow be convinced to escape
without further interactions through the first wall surrounding the few 1000 m3 plasma zone.
Next, the neutrons have to interact with a “neutron multiplier” material like beryllium in
such a manner that the neutron flux is increased without transferring too much energy to the
remaining nucleons. The neutrons then must transfer their energy without being absorbed
(e.g. by elastic scattering) to some kind of gas or liquid, like high pressure helium gas, within
the lithium blanket. This heated gas has to be collected somehow from the gigantic blanket
volume and must flow to the outside. This heat can be used as in any existing power plant
to power a generator turbine. This liquid should be as hot as possible, in order to achieve
reasonable efficiency for electricity production. However, it is known that the lithium blanket
temperature can not be too high; this limits the efficiency to values well below those from
today’s nuclear fission reactors, which also do not have a very high efficiency.
Once the heat is extracted and the neutrons are slowed sufficiently, they must make the
inelastic interaction with the Li6 isotope, which makes about 7.5% of the natural lithium.
The minimal thickness of the lithium blanket that surrounds the entire plasma zone has been
estimated to be at least 1 meter. Unfortunately, lithium like hydrogen (tritium atoms are
chemically identical to hydrogen) in its pure form is chemically highly reactive. If used in a
chemical bound state with oxygen, for example, the oxygen itself could interact and absorb
neutrons, something that must be avoided. In addition, lithium and the produced tritium will
react chemically - which is certainly not included in any present computer modeling - and
some tritium atoms will be blocked within the blanket. Unfortunately, additional neutron and
tritium losses can not be allowed as will be described in more detail in section 5.2.
• Next, an efficient way has to be found to extract the tritium quickly, and without loss, from
this lithium blanket before it decays. We are talking about a huge blanket here, one that
surrounds the few 1000 m3 plasma volume. Extracting and collecting the tritium from this
huge lithium blanket will be very tricky indeed, since tritium penetrates thin walls relatively
easily, and since accumulations of tritium are highly explosive. (An interesting description of
some of these difficulties that have already been encountered in a small scale experiment can
be found in reference [38].)
Finally assuming we get that far, the extracted and collected tritium and deuterium, which
both need to be extremely clean, need to be transported, without losses, back to the reactor
zone.
Each of the unsolved problems described above is, by itself, serious enough to raise doubts about the
success of commercial fusion reactors. But the self-sufficient tritium breeding is especially problematic,
as will be described in the next section.
5.2 The illusions of tritium self-sufficiency
The fact is, a self-sustained tritium fusion chain appears to be not simply problematic but absolutely
impossible. To see why, we will now look into some details based on what is already known about this
problem.
A central quantity for any fission reactor is its criticality, namely that exactly one neutron, out of the
two to three neutrons “liberated” per fission reaction, will enable another nuclear fission reaction. More
than 99% of the liberated fission energy is taken by the heavy fission products such as barium and krypton
and this energy is relatively easily transferred to a cooling medium. The energy of the produced fission
neutrons is about 1 MeV. In order to achieve the criticality condition, the surrounding material must have
a very low neutron absorption cross section and the neutrons must be slowed down to eV energies. For
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a self-sustained chain reaction to happen, a large amount of U235, enriched to 3-5%, is usually required.
Once the nominal power is obtained, the chain reaction can be regulated using materials with a very high
neutron absorption cross section. A much higher enrichment of 20% is required for fast reactors without
moderators and up to 90% for bombs.
In contrast to fission reactions, only one 14 MeV neutron is liberated in the D + T→ He + n fusion
reaction. This neutron energy has to be transferred to a medium using elastic collisions. Once this is
done, the neutron is supposed to make an inelastic interaction with a lithium nucleus, splitting it into
tritium and helium.
Starting with the above reaction one can calculate how much tritium burning is required for contin-
uously operating commercial fusion reactor assuming a power production of 1 GW(thermal)5. One finds
that about 55.6 Kg of tritium needs to be burned per year with an average thermal power of 1 GW.
Today tritium is extracted from nuclear reactors at extraordinary cost - about 30 million US dollar
per kg from Canadian heavy water reactors. These old heavy water reactors will probably stop operation
around the year 2025 and it is expected that a total tritium inventory of 27 kg will have been accumulated
by that year [39]. Once these reactors stop operating, this inventory will be depleted by more than 5% per
year due to its radioactive decay alone -tritium has a half-life of 12.3 years. As a result, for the prototype
“PROTO” fusion reactor, which fusion optimists imagine to start operation not before the year 2050, at
best only 7 Kg of tritium might remain for the start (Normal fission reactors produce at most 2-3 Kg per
year and the extraction costs have been estimated to be 200 million dollars per kg [39].). It is thus obvious
that any future fusion reactor experiment beyond ITER must not only achieve tritium self-sufficiency, it
must create more tritium than it uses if there are to be any further fusion projects.
The particularly informative website of professor Abdou from UCLA, one of the world’s leading experts
on tritium breeding, gives some relevant numbers both about the basic requirements for tritium breeding
and the state of the art today [40].
But first things first: Understanding such “expert” discussions requires an acquaintance with some
key terms:
• The “required tritium breeding ratio”, rTBR, stands for the minimal number of tritium nuclei
which must be produced per fusion reaction in order to keep the system going. It must be larger
than one, because of tritium decay and other losses and because of the necessary inventory in the
tritium processing system and the stockpile for outages and for the startup of other plants. The
rTBR value depends on many system and technology parameters.
• The “achievable tritium breeding ratio”, aTBR, is the value obtained from complicated and exten-
sive computer simulations - so-called 3-dimensional simulations - of the blanket with its lithium
and other materials. The aTBR value depends on many parameters like the first wall material and
the incomplete coverage of the breeding blanket.
• Other important variables are used to define quantitatively the value of the rTBR. These include:
(1) the “tritium doubling time”, the time in years required to double the original inventory; (2) The
“fractional tritium burn up” within the plasma, expected to be at best a few %; (3) The “reserve
time”, the tritium inventory required in days to restart the reactor after some system malfunctioning
with a related tritium loss; and (4) The ratio between the calculated and the experimentally obtained
TBR.
The handling of neutrons, tritium and lithium requires particular care, not only because of radiation,
but also because tritium and lithium atoms are chemically very reactive elements. Consequently, real-
world, large-scale experiments are difficult to perform and our understanding of tritium breeding is based
5This is relatively small compared to standard 3 GW(thermal) fission reactors which achieve up to 95% steady
state operation.
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almost entirely on complicated and extensive computer simulations, which can only be done in a few
places around the world.
Some of these results are described in a publication by Sawan and Abdou from December 2005 [41].
The authors assume that a commercial fusion power reactor of 1.5 GW (burning about 83 kg of tritium
per year) would require a long-term inventory of 9 kg and they further assume that the required start-up
tritium is available.
They argue that according to their calculations, the absolute minimum rTBR is 1.15, assuming a
doubling time of more than 4 years, a fractional tritium burn-up larger than 5% and a reserve time of
less than 5 days. Requiring a shorter doubling time of 1 year, their calculations indicate that the rTBR
should be around 1.5. Other numbers can be read from their figures. For example one finds that if the
fractional burn-up would be 1%6 the rTBR should be 1.4 for a 5 year doubling time and even 2.6 for a 1
year doubling time.
The importance of short tritium doubling times can be understood easily using the following calcula-
tion. Assuming these numbers can be achieved and that 27 kg tritium (2025) minus the 9 kg long term
inventory, would be available at start-up, then 18 kg could be burned in the first year. A doubling time
of 4 years would thus mean that such a commercial 1.5 GW(thermal) reactor can operate at full power
only 8 years after the start-up.
And if anything these rTBR estimates are far too optimistic since a number of potential losses related
to the tritium extraction, collection and transport are not considered in today’s simulations.
The details become even more troubling when we turn to the tritium breeding numbers that have
been obtained with computer simulations.
After many years of detailed studies, current simulations show that the blanket designs of today have,
at best, achieved TBR’s of 1.15. Using this number, Sawan and Abdou conclude that theoretically a small
window for tritium self-sufficiency still exists. This window requires (1) a fractional tritium burn up of
more than 5%, (2) a tritium reserve time of less than 5 days and (3) a doubling time of more than 4 years.
But using these numbers, the authors believe it is difficult even to imagine a real operating power plant.
In their words, “for fusion to be a serious contender for energy production, shorter doubling times than 5
years are needed”, and the fact is, doubling times much shorter than 5 years appear to be required, which
means TBR’s much higher than 1.15 are necessary. To make matters worse, they also acknowledge that
current systems of tritium handling need to be explored further. This probably means that the tritium
extraction methods from nuclear fission reactors are nowhere near meeting the requirements.
Sawan and Abdou also summarize various effects which reduce the obtained aTBR numbers once more
realistic reactor designs are studied and structural materials, gaps, and first wall thickness are considered.
For example they find that as the first wall, made of steel, is increased by 4 cm starting from a 0.4 cm
wall, the aTBR drops by about 16%. It would be interesting to compare these assumptions about the first
wall with the ones used in previous plasma physics experiments like JET and the one proposed for ITER.
Unfortunately, we have so far not been able to obtain any corresponding detailed information. However,
as it is expected that the first wall in a real fusion reactor will erode by up to a few mm per fusion year,
the required thin walls seem to be one additional impossible assumption made by the fusion proponents.
Other effects, as described in detail by Sawan and Abdou [41], are known to reduce the aTBR even
further. The most important ones come from the cooling material required to transport the heat away
from the breeding zone, from the electric insulator material, from the incomplete angular coverage of the
inner plasma zone with a volume of more than 1000 m3 and from the plasma control requirements.
This list of problems is already very long and shows that the belief in a self-sufficient tritium chain
is completely unfounded. However, on top of that, some still very idealized TBR experiments have been
performed now. These real experiments show, according to Sawan and Abdou [41], that the measured
TBR results are consistently about 15% lower than the modeling predicts. They write in their publication:
“the large overestimate (of the aTBR) from the calculation is alarming and implies that an intense R&D
6The fractional tritium burn-up during the short MW pulses in JET was roughly 0.0001%.
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program is needed to validate and update .. our ability to accurately predict the achievable TBR.”
One might conclude that a correct interpretation could have been:
Today’s experiments show consistently that no window for a self-sufficient tritium breeding currently
exists and suggest that proposals that speak of future tritium breeding are based on nothing more than
hopes, fantasies, misunderstandings, or even intentional misrepresentations.
5.3 Ending the dreams about controlled nuclear fusion
As we have explained above, there is a long list of fundamental problems concerning controlled fusion.
Each of them appears to be large enough to raise serious doubts about the viability of the chosen approach
to a commercial fusion reactor and thus about the 10 billion dollar ITER project.
Those not familiar with the handling of high neutron fluxes or the possible chemical reactions of tritium
and lithium atoms might suppose that these problems are well known within the fusion community and
are being studied intensively. But the truth is, none of these problems have been studied intensively and,
at best, even with the ITER project, the only problems that might be studied relate to some of the plasma
stability issues outlined in section 5.1. All of the other problem areas are essentially ignored in today’s
discussions among “ITER experts”.
Confronted with the seemingly impossible tritium self-sufficiency problem that must be solved before
a commercial fusion reactor is possible, the “ITER experts” change the subject and tell you that this is
not a problem for their ITER project. In their view it will not be until the next generation of experiments
- experiments that will not begin for roughly another 30 years according to official plans - that issues
related to tritium self-sufficiency will have to be dealt with. Perhaps they are also comfortable with the
fact that neither the problems related to material aging due to the high neutron flux nor the problems
related to tritium and lithium handling can be tested with ITER. Perhaps they expect miracles from the
next generation of experiments.
However among those who are not part of ITER and those who do not expect miracles, it seems
that times are changing. More and more scientists are coming to the conclusion that commercial fusion
reactors can never become reality. Some are even receiving a little attention from the media as they argue
louder and louder that the entire ITER project has nothing to do with energy research [42].
One scientist who should be receiving more attention than he is, is Professor Abdou. In a presen-
tation in 2003 that was prepared on behalf of the US fusion chamber technology community for the US
Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Science on Fusion Chamber Technology he wrote that “Tritium
supply and self-sufficiency are ‘Go-No Go’ issue for fusion energy, [and are therefore] as critical NOW as
demonstrating a burning plasma” [capitalization in original]. He pointed out that “There is NOT a single
experiment yet in the fusion environment that shows that the DT fusion fuel cycle is viable. He said that
“Proceeding with ITER makes Chamber Research even more critical” and he asked “What should we do
to communicate this message to those who influence fusion policy outside DOE?” [43]. In short, to go
ahead with ITER without addressing these chamber technology issues makes no sense at all. In light of
everything that has been said in this section, it seems clear that this is what should be done:
Tell the truth to the tax payers, the policy makers and to the media; tell them that, after 50 years of
very costly fusion research conducted at various locations around the world, enough knowledge exists to
state:
1. that today’s achievements in all relevant areas are still many orders of magnitude away from the
basic requirements of a fusion prototype reactor;
2. that no material or structure is known which can withstand the extremely high neutron flux expected
under realistic deuterium-tritium fusion conditions; and
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3. that self-sufficient tritium breeding appears to be absolutely impossible to achieve under the con-
ditions required to operate a commercial fusion reactor.
It is late, but perhaps not too late, to acknowledge that the ITER project is at this point nothing
more than an expensive experiment to investigate some fundamental aspects of plasma physics. Since this
would in effect acknowledge that the current ITER funding process is based on faulty assumptions and
that ITER should in all fairness be funded on equal terms with all other research projects, acknowledging
these truths will not be easy. But it is the only honest thing to do.
It is also the only path that will allow us to transfer from ITER to other more promising research the
enormous resources and the highly skilled talents that need now to be brought to bear on our increasingly
urgent energy problems. In short, this is the only path that will allow us to stop “throwing good money
after bad” and to start dealing with our emerging energy crisis in a realistic way.
6 Summary
In this final chapter IV of our analysis about the “Future of Nuclear energy” we have presented the status
and prospects for nuclear fuel breeder fission reactors and the situation with nuclear fusion.
Despite the often repeated claims that the technology for fast reactors is well understood, one finds that
no evidence exists to back up such claims. In fact their huge construction costs, their poor safety records
and their inefficient performance give little reason to believe that they will ever become commercially
significant.
Indeed, no evidence has been presented so far that the original goal of nuclear fuel breeding has been
achieved. The design and running plans for the two FBR’s, currently under construction in India and in
Russia do not indicate that successful breeding can even in principle be achieved.
Nevertheless, assuming that huge and costly efforts are made during the next 20-30 years, a remote
possibility of mastering of nuclear fission breeder reactors can still be imagined. However, it is unclear if
(1) enough highly enriched uranium remains to start future commercial breeder reactors on a large scale
in 30-40 years from now and (2) if the people in rich societies will accept risky and costly research efforts
during times of economic difficulties. In any case Fast Breeder reactors even with the most optimistic
assumptions will come far too late to compensate for the coming energy declines following the peak of oil
and gas.
In contrast to remaining open questions with fission breeders, we find that the accumulated knowledge
about nuclear fusion is already large enough to conclude that commercial fusion power is not only 50 years
away but that it will always be 50 years away.
The current situation concerning the future of nuclear energy appears in many respects similar to the
one described in a famous fairy tail, [44], but with a slightly modified ending:
“In the coming “autumn and winter” of our industrial civilization
brought on by the decline of fossil fuels, it seems clear that the clothes
of the Nuclear Fission Energy emperor are far too thin to keep him and
others warm and that the Nuclear Fusion Emperor has no clothes at all!”.
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